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Resilient Critical Infrastructure Planning Under
Disruptions Considering Recovery Scheduling
Yi-Ping Fang , Member, IEEE, Chao Fang , Enrico Zio, Senior Member, IEEE, and Min Xie, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Reliable and safe critical infrastructures are crucial
for the sustainability of modern societies. To cope with increasing
disruptive events such as man-made and natural disasters attack-
ing infrastructures, resilience should be considered as an integrated
perspective into the system planning process. This paper presents a
p-robust optimization model for infrastructure network planning
against spatially localized disruptions. The optimization aims at
minimizing the investment costs for system hardening and expan-
sion and the total system costs under nominal operating conditions,
while incorporating resilience requirements by the p-robustness
constraints. Importantly, instead of only mitigating system vulner-
ability, the proposed model integrates the arranging of the repair
sequence of damaged components under limited repair resources
into the preevent system planning. The complexity of the proposed
model is analyzed, and a hybrid algorithm that combines scenario-
based decomposition and variable neighborhood search is devel-
oped for its efficient solution. The effectiveness of the approach is
illustrated through an application to a real power transmission sys-
tem. Quantitative analysis can assist managers in decision making
regarding investing in different system protection actions and mak-
ing a tradeoff between desired resilience and budget constraints.
Index Terms—Critical infrastructures (CIs), disruption risk, op-
timization, system planning, system resilience.
NOMENCLATURE
Indexes, parameters, and sets
G(V, L0) An undirected graph {G} comprising a set of
nodes V connected by a set of links L0 repre-
senting the original network system before the
disruption.
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VG, VT , VD Sets of supply, transship, and demand nodes,
respectively, VG ∪ VT ∪ VD = V .
S Set of all SLD scenarios considered.
L′ Set of prospective transmission lines for expan-
sion.
L Union of sets L0 and L′.
n Index of nodes.
l Index of lines.
i Index of nodes and lines, i ∈ {n, l}.
t Index of time period.
s Index of disruption scenario.
Parameters
B Total budget available for building new lines and
hardening existing facilities [dollar].
Ts Total time periods of system restoration under
scenario s ∈ S.
f̄l Flow capacity of line l ∈ L = L0 ∪ L′.
ḡn Supply capacity in supply node n ∈ VG.
p̄n Expected demand at node n ∈ VD.
o(l) Origin or sending node of line l.
d(l) Destination or receiving node of line l.
K Number of repair crews available for postdisrup-
tion system restoration activity.
ρi Time duration required to repair a damaged facil-
ity i ∈ {n, l}, e.g., [hour].
ais ais = 0 if facility i is damaged in scenario s ∈ S,
1 otherwise.
chari Annualized cost of investment in hardening facil-
ity i [dollar].
cinvl Annualized cost of investment in construct-
ing/expanding transmission line l ∈ L′ [dollar].
co&mn O&M cost associated with unit of flow generated
at node n ∈ VG [dollar per unit of flow].
cemin Emission (environmental) cost associated with
unit of flow generated at node n ∈ VG, [dollar
per unit of flow].
co&ml Operational and maintenance cost associated
with unit of flow through arc l ∈ L [dollar per
unit of flow].
ce&sn Economic and societal cost of each unit of inter-
rupted service at demand noden ∈ VD [dollar per
unit of flow].
CINV Annualized investment costs [dollar].
COPC Total (hourly) system costs under nominal
operation condition [dollar].
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σ Weighting parameter makingCOPC andCINV the
same scale.
C∗s Optimum scenario penalty costs [dollar].
p A given constant setting the upper bounds on the
maximal allowable relative regret for each dis-
ruption scenario.
Decision variables
vl vl = 1 if prospective line l ∈ L′ is built, 0 other-
wise.
wi wi = 1 if a facility i ∈ {n, l} is selected to be
hardened, 0 otherwise
rits rits = 1 if facility i is repaired at the beginning
of time t under scenario s, otherwise 0.
Auxiliary decision variables
xits xits = 1 if facility i is functional at the beginning
of time period t under scenario s, otherwise 0.
flts Amount of flow passing through arc l ∈ L at time
t under scenario s.
gnts Amount of generated flow at noden ∈ VG at time
t under scenario s.
Δpnts Amount of unsatisfied demand at node n ∈ VD at
time t under scenario s.
fl, gn,Δpn Variables under the nominal operation scenario,
i.e., the scenario without disruption, correspond-
ing to flts, gnts,Δpnts that are used for disruptive
scenario s.
I. INTRODUCTION
CRITICAL infrastructure (CIs) systems (such as energy,transportation, water distribution, and other lifeline net-
works) are indispensable for modern societies to provide
essential services that support economic prosperity, social se-
curity and stability, and quality of life [1]–[4]. Nowadays,
these infrastructure systems suffer increasing disruption risks
in terms of both frequency and consequences, e.g., man-made
or natural disasters and terrorist attacks, making critical infras-
tructure protection (CIP) a priority for our societies [4]. To
strengthen the security and resilience of national/regional CIs,
many governments and organizations have initiated CIP plans,
in which the concept of infrastructure “resilience” has been
highlighted [5].
The term “resilience” has many definitions, without a broadly
accepted one, even only focusing on CIs [6], [7]. A complicating
aspect in previous attempts to define resilience is the recognition
that “resilience is a family of related ideas, not a single thing”
[8]. Following our previous studies [7], [9], [10] and being con-
sistent with most of the literature [6], we define resilience of a
CI system as the joint ability of this system to resist (prevent
and withstand) any possible hazard, absorb initial damage, and
quickly recover to normal operation. It can be quantified based
upon the system real functionality curve under disruptions and
the targeted functionality curve without disruption during a re-
covery time horizon.
In the case of failure due to disruptions (e.g., technical ac-
cidents or intentional attacks), preevent actions and postevent
solutions are needed to mitigate disruptive damages and recover
the system to normal conditions. Identification and optimization
of preevent measures for protecting infrastructures has been a
focus problem in the related works [4], [11]–[13]. Preevent mea-
sures proposed in the literature include risk screening [14], en-
hancing system redundancy [15], [16], hardening system com-
ponents [7], [17]–[19], optimizing system design [20], [21], etc.
However, most of the studies on the optimization of preevent
measures do not consider the postevent restoration processes and
only take the performance drop or system operation cost func-
tions immediately after the disruptions (i.e., robustness) as the
objective function (robustness is indeed one of the components
of system resilience) [22]. For the postevent restoration, many
quantitative restoration models have been proposed for inves-
tigating the community restoration time [23], [24], evaluating
the direct and indirect losses of CI systems under disruptions
[25], [26], studying the effect of interdependencies on postevent
CI functionalities [27]. Also, there have been some studies on
postevent CI restoration planning, aimed at identifying the op-
timum restoration operations at the infrastructure component
level, e.g., scheduling the repair sequence of damaged compo-
nents and allocating limited repair resources, for a rapid system
performance recovery [10], [28]–[31]. However, very few inves-
tigations integrate postevent recovery into the preevent planning
and management of networked CIs. Some studies considered the
recovery process, but they did not consider the restoration se-
quence of damaged components [32]–[35].
To bridge this gap, this paper introduces a mixed-integer pro-
gramming (MIP) model to optimize the p-robustness CI ex-
pansion and protection planning (p-CIEPP) against spatially
localized disruptions (SLDs). In particular, the model seeks the
minimum-nominal-cost solution that is p-robust, i.e., whose rel-
ative regret is no more than 100p% in each SLD scenario (higher
value of p means that the decision maker (DM) can tolerate a
greater loss under each disruption scenario). Instead of only mit-
igating system vulnerability, the proposed model for the first
time integrates the arranging of the repair sequence of damaged
components under limited repair resources into the preevent sys-
tem planning. As considering the restoration process makes the
model very difficult to be solved, a hybrid algorithm that com-
bines scenario-based decomposition (SBD) with variable neigh-
borhood search (VNS) [36] is proposed to efficiently solve the
problem. By applying the proposed approach to a case study of
real power transmission systems, it shows the ability to support
decision making such as how to better invest in system hardening
and protection for resilient CIs.
The model proposed in this paper aims to find expansion and
protection plans for CIs that make the systems perform well un-
der nominal conditions and, at the same time, is able to efficiently
deal with short-term disruptions. The p-robustness measure is
adopted mainly because of the following reasons: 1) the opti-
mization with the p-robustness measure is flexible enough to
accommodate other objectives, such as the nominal investment
and operation costs, considered in this study, while other robust
criteria like minimax cost and minimax regret [37] cannot easily
do so; and 2) the proposed model is motivated by the needs of
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real CI DMs, e.g., power system utilities, who usually wish to
limit the regret in each possible contingency to bound system
exposure to risk, but are even more concerned with minimizing
the nominal operation cost, knowing that the nominal scenario
is the most likely to occur and that it is typically difficult to
estimate the probabilities of disruption scenarios in practice.
The contributions of this paper are highlighted as follows.
1) A quantitative optimization model with the p-robustness
measure that integrates system resilience is proposed for
the planning and management of networked CIs.
2) The model integrates the arranging of the repair sequence
of damaged components under limited repair resources
into the preevent system planning.
3) The complexity of the proposed model is rigorously
analyzed.
4) An efficient hybrid algorithm that combines SBD with
VNS is proposed for the solution of the problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II in-
troduces a p-robustness optimization model and analyzes the
problem complexity. Section III develops a hybrid SBD-VNS
algorithm to solve the model. Section IV illustrates the appli-
cation of the approach to a real power transmission system and
discusses managerial implications based on the computational
results. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND MODEL FORMULATION
In this paper, we study the CI expansion and protection
planning (CIEPP) problem by taking into account the resilience
of the system. The problem is addressed from the perspective of
a centralized decision-making agency, which pursues the overall
welfare of the system, e.g., a public transmission system opera-
tor of power systems. In particular, a p-robustness mathematical
model is proposed with the objective of minimizing the total
cost, which is the sum of the investment costs and the total system
costs under nominal operating condition. Meanwhile, the sys-
tem is protected against potential disruptive events by enforcing
an acceptable regret level of system resilience loss for all the dis-
ruption scenarios considered. In other words, system resilience
is represented by the p-robustness constraint. The decisions of
the problem are made in two stages: planning decisions and re-
course actions. In the first stage, two user-defined system invest-
ment/protection options are considered: 1) hardening existing fa-
cilities (nodes and lines) to lower the probability of damage; and
2) building new lines to add system redundancy. The planning
decisions are determined before the realization of the uncertain
disruptive events is known. Once a disruptive event is ob-
served, recourse actions, including allocating repair resources,
scheduling repair tasks, and reassigning network flows, may be
deployed, which are regarded as the second-stage decisions.
The assumptions of the CIEPP model referring to the flows
and capacities of CI systems, the disruptions studied, and the
costs related to the investment and operation of the system, are
listed as follows.
1) The CI network is composed of links and nodes serving for
transporting commodities/energy/information, etc., which
can be represented by network flows.
2) There is a known demand or supply for each node and a
known flow capacity for each link.
3) Links and nodes are subject to failure, and failed ones
are completely unusable before being repaired or recon-
structed.
4) The time duration used to repair each damaged component
is given, and there are a known number of repair crews for
system restoration.
5) The DMs have a budget to invest in protecting existing
nodes/links or constructing new ones so that they are in-
vulnerable to disruptive scenarios.
A. Problem Statement
A networked CI system, such as a power grid, a water dis-
tribution network, or a communication network, is modeled by
an undirected network G(V, L0). Each node in such a system
n ∈ V might represent generators, buses for electric power sys-
tems, or pump stations, and compressors for pipeline systems,
and each link l ∈ L0 could be transmission lines, transformers
for electric power systems, or gas pipeline segments for pipeline
systems. Let fl be the amount of energy, data, or load, etc., trans-
ferred along with line l. There is a set of supply or source nodes
in the system, VG ⊆ V , a set of transshipment nodes, VT ⊆ V ,
and a set of demand nodes, VD ⊆ V . Each line l ∈ L0 has an as-
sociated flow capacity f̄l ∈ R+, while each supply noden ∈ VG
has a supply capacity ḡn ∈ R+, and each demand node n ∈ VD
has a demand p̄n ∈ R+ for its nominal operation.
As mentioned before, two user-defined system protection
practices are considered in the planning of system expansion
and protection. First, we assume that the DMs have the ability
to protect nodes or lines so that they are invulnerable to damage,
which means that the protected facilities can still work even after
a disruptive event occurs. Second, the DMs are willing to build
any new lines L′, and any newly built line is invulnerable to dis-
ruption (i.e., protection and hardening measures will be adopted
for all the newly constructed lines). The union of L0 and L′ is
denoted as L. Indeed, it is essentially difficult or impossible to
protect CI system components to make them invulnerable to any
disruption, although grid-hardening measures like underground-
ing power lines and upgrading transmission line materials (e.g.,
high-temperature and low-sag conductors) in power systems can
make the lines reasonably invulnerable to certain disruptive sce-
narios, such as high winds and extreme heat. In this paper, the
ultimate goal is to identify system components, which, when
“hardened,” yield the best improvement in system resilience.
Therefore, for simplicity and not considering extreme severe
events, we adopt the common assumption that the DMs have the
capacity to protect vulnerable components so that they can sur-
vive and keep operating during a disruptive event [7], [17], [38],
[39]. Fig. 1(a) presents a simple infrastructure network with two
protection measures.
Then, we let binary variables vl andwi represent the decisions
of building prospective lines l ∈ L′ and hardening existing fa-
cilities i ∈ V ∪ L0, and their annualized investment costs are
denoted by cinvl and c
har
i , respectively. Hence, the annualized
investment cost is represented as
CINV =
∑
i∈V ∪L0
chari wi +
∑
l∈L′
cinvl vl. (1)
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Fig. 1. (a) Notional infrastructure system: circles labeled with G represent the source nodes, circles labeled with T represent transshipment nodes, and circles
labeled with D represent the demand nodes. (b) Illustrative SLD scenario whose epicenter is located at D5 and with an influence radius of Rh.
The definition of investment costs in (1) can be easily modi-
fied by adding (removing) the related costs if more (fewer) pro-
tection measures are considered for specific CI systems.
In addition, there is an operational and maintenance (O&M)
cost co&mn and an emission cost c
emi
n associated with a unit of flow
generation and an O&M cost co&ml associated with a unit of flow
through arc l ∈ L. Furthermore, the impact of the interruption
of service at each demand node on the community is determined
by the amount of the interrupted demand multiplied by a penalty
cost ce&sn , which represents the average economic and societal
value of the interrupted demand, and is usually measured in
monetary units. For example, in power systems, the penalty cost
of lost load can be calculated using the commonly used value
of lost load [40], [41], which is defined as the estimated amount
that power customers receiving electricity with firm contracts
would be willing to pay to avoid a disruption in their electricity
service [40]. Similar definitions can be applied when other CI
systems are considered, e.g., the cost of disruption of gas supply
[42] and the cost of welfare losses from urban water supply dis-
ruptions [43]. Accordingly, the total system costs under nominal
operation condition can be represented as
COPC =
∑
n∈VG
(
co&mn + c
emi
n
)
gn
+
∑
l∈L
co&ml fl +
∑
n∈VD
ce&sn Δpn (2)
where gn is the amount of generated flow at node n ∈ VG within
a unit of time (e.g., 1 h), and Δpn is the unsatisfied service at
the demand node n ∈ VD. The total system costs under nom-
inal operation conditions COPC comprise: 1) the O&M costs
and emission costs for generating unit at all suppliers; 2) the
O&M costs for transporting unit across the whole network; and
3) the economic penalty costs for all unmet services at the de-
mand nodes. It is noted that this definition of system costs by
(2) is inspired by the operational costs of electricity infrastruc-
tures, including the power generation costs (first item), power
transmission costs (second item), and lost load costs (third item).
When applying (2) to other CIs like water distribution networks,
some costs may not exist, e.g., the emission costs; then, the cor-
responding coefficients can simply take the value of zero.
Consequently, the objective of the CIEPP is to minimize the
sum of the annualized investment costs CINV and the total sys-
tem costs under nominal operation condition COPC
min CINV + σ · COPC (3)
where σ is a weighting/discount factor to make investment and
operation costs comparable. Note that the objective function (3)
is general enough for the CIEPP problem, though the definitions
of CINV and COPC may vary when applying to different CI
systems.
Another objective of the CIEPP is system resilience, for which
we consider a set of scenarios representing potential disruptive
events that may occur on the CI system, denoted by S, and each
of the scenarios specifies a set of facilities that are disrupted si-
multaneously. An attacked facility will become nonoperational,
i.e., unable to transmit network flow, if it has not been protected.
Without loss of generality, any unrepaired facility is assumed to
lose its function during the considered time horizon. The func-
tionality of system facilities is modeled here by binary states,
i.e., fully operational and nonoperational.
In this paper, we integrate the arranging of the repair sequence
of damaged components under limited repair resources into the
preevent CIEPP framework. We assume that the time duration
used to repair each damaged facility is given, and there is a
known number of repair crews, which are the only limited re-
sources for system restoration. In practice, there are other limited
resources like the spare parts for CI system restoration. However,
it is difficult or even impossible to model all the required repair
resources if we are not looking at the details of component types
and their damage types/levels. Therefore, in the literature, the
number of repair crews is usually considered as the only limited
resource for general infrastructure systems [7], [41]. Actually,
repair crews here are not necessarily only the repair workers: it
can be understood as a group of repair workers with adequate
material resources required to carry out the repair tasks.
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Formally, let Ts be the total time periods of system restoration
under disruptive scenario s ∈ S, and Δpnts be the amount of
unsatisfied demand at node n ∈ VD at time t ∈ {1 . . . Ts} under
scenario s ∈ S; then, the penalty cost for system performance
loss under scenario s (or called scenario cost) is given by
CRESI (s) =
∑
n∈VD
ce&sn
Ts∑
t=1
Δpnts. (4)
Note that CRESI(s) takes into account the cumulative system
functionality loss over the whole restoration horizon, represent-
ing the loss of system resilience under disruption scenario s.
This definition of resilience loss is equivalent to the size of the
so-called resilience triangle [22]. Then, the goal is to ensure
that the scenario cost CRESI(s) is within an acceptable bound-
ary for all the considered scenarios in order to achieve system
resilience. This objective is implemented in this paper by the
p-robust criterion [44], [45], which will be introduced in detail
in the following section.
B. p-CIEPP Model
A p-robustness optimization formulation is provided in this
section for the CIEPP problem described in Section II-A. The
objective of the p-CIEPP is given by
min CINV + σΔCOPC (5)
which seeks to minimize the sum of the annualized investment
costs CINV and the weighted total system costs under nominal
operation condition COPC. This objective function quantifies
the total nominal costs of a CI system in terms of its economic,
environmental, and societal impacts. We assume that the latter
two can be transformed into monetary units in this paper.
The constraints of the p-CIEPP model are given and explained
as follows.
1) p-Robustness Constraints:
CRESI (s) ≤ (1 + p)C∗s ∀s ∈ S. (6)
Constraints (6) enforce the p-robust criterion [44], [45] for
the system resilience loss against each disruption scenario. It
requires the scenario penalty costs CRESI(s) be not more than
100(1 + p)% of the optimal scenario penalty costs C∗s , which is
calculated by solving the CIEPP for each of the given scenario s,
denoted as CIEPPS (the detailed formulation of CIEPPS is given
at the end of this section). Note that CIEPPS is a deterministic
(i.e., single-scenario) minimization problem, indexed by the sce-
nario index s, that is, for each s ∈ S, there is a different problem
CIEPPS. The structure of these problems is identical; only the
data are different. For each s, let C∗s be the optimal objective
value for CIEPPS. The constraints (6) can be equivalently rep-
resented as
CRESI (s)− C∗s
C∗s
≤ p ∀s ∈ S (7)
whose left-hand side is the relative regret for scenario s; the
absolute regret is given by CRESI(s)− C∗s . The p-robust mea-
sure sets upper bounds on the maximum allowable relative regret
about the system resilience loss for each scenario. This definition
of p-robustness is consistent with that given by [44]–[46].
2) Operational Constraints Under Disruptive Scenarios:
∑
l∈L|o(l)=n
flts −
∑
l∈L|d(l)=n
flts = gnts ∀n ∈ VG∀t, s (8)
∑
l∈L|o(l)=n
flts −
∑
l∈L|d(l)=n
flts = 0 ∀n ∈ VT∀t, s (9)
∑
l∈L|d(l)=n
flts −
∑
l∈L|o(l)=n
flts +Δpnts = p̄n
∀n ∈ VD∀t, s (10)
0 ≤ gnts ≤ ḡn ∀n ∈ VG∀t, s (11)
0 ≤ Δpnts ≤ p̄n ∀n ∈ VD∀t, s (12)
−xo(l)tsf̄l ≤ flts ≤ xo(l)tsf̄l ∀l ∈ L∀t, s (13)
−xd(l)tsf̄l ≤ flts ≤ xd(l)tsf̄l ∀l ∈ L∀t, s (14)
−xltsf̄l ≤ flts ≤ xltsf̄l ∀l ∈ L∀t, s. (15)
Constraints (8)–(15) represent system operational restrictions
under disruptive scenarios. Specifically, constraints (8)–(12) are
the flow conservation constraints: for supply nodes, we require
the flow out to be less than or equal to the supply capacity (8),
(11); for demand nodes, we require the flow in to be equal to
the nominal demand minus unmet demand (10), (12); and for
transshipment nodes, we require the flow in to be equal to the
flow out (9). Constraints (13)–(15) force the arc flows to fall
within a given capacity taking into account that positive flows
can only be achieved if the given arc, as well as its tail and head
nodes, is fully functional under disruption scenario s.
3) Constraints Concerning System Restoration Decisions:
xits ≥ wi ∀i ∈ L0 ∪ V ∀t, s (16)
xits ≥ ais ∀i ∈ L0 ∪ V ∀t, s (17)
xits ≤ wi + ais +
t−1∑
τ=1
riτs ∀i ∈ L0 ∪ V ∀t, s (18)
xlts = vl ∀l ∈ L′∀t, s (19)
ρi∑
t=1
rits = 0 ∀i ∈ L0 ∪ V ∀s ∈ S (20)
Ts∑
t=1
rits ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ L0 ∪ V ∀s ∈ S (21)
∑
n∈V
τ=min{t+ρn−1, Ts}∑
τ=t
rnτs
+
∑
l∈L0
τ=min{t+ρl−1, Ts}∑
τ=t
rlτs ≤ K ∀t, s. (22)
Formulas (16)–(22) are constraints concerning system
restoration decisions, and they capture the relationships among
the restoration scheduling decisions under disruption scenario s.
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In particular, constraints (16)–(18) ensure that a facility i is out
of functionality in the network at the beginning of time period t,
if and only if it has not been hardened, has been damaged in the
scenario, and has not been repaired by some repair crews before
time period t. If facility i has either been hardened, i.e., wi = 1,
or not failed, i.e., ais = 1, it will keep functioningxits = 1∀t, s,
enforced by constraints (16) and (17); on the contrary, when
wi = 0 and ais = 0, the state of facility i (i.e., xits) is deter-
mined by whether it has been repaired before time t, i.e., the
item
∑t−1
τ=1 riτs in constraints (18). If it has not been repaired
before time t, i.e.,
∑t−1
τ=1 riτs = 0, the right-hand side of con-
straints (18) is 0, forcing xits = 0; otherwise, the right-hand side
of constraints (18) is 1, andxits will take the value of 1 in the cost-
minimization problem. Constraints (19) ensure that the newly
built lines are invulnerable and always operational. Constraints
(20) state that a facility cannot be repaired in a period earlier
than its required processing time. Constraints (21) state that a
failed facility can only be repaired once at most. Constraints (22)
limit the deployment of a given number of repair crews in each
period. The upper bound τ = min{t+ ρl − 1, Ts} is given by
the smaller value between the period that the restoration of line
l is finished and the total time horizon of system restoration un-
der each scenario Ts. Basically, the summation of the decision
variable rlτs over the restoration time,
∑τ=min{t+ρl−1, Ts}
τ=t rlτs,
indicates whether one repair crew has been occupied by the
restoration activity of line l or not, since only when a repair
crew has already been assigned to restore line l at time t, it is
possible to finish this restoration at any time τ ∈ [t, t+ ρl − 1],
i.e., rlτs = 1 for τ ∈ [t, t+ ρl − 1].
Note that constraints (16)–(22) together with the p-robust cri-
terion (6) model the postevent restoration planning, aiming to
allocate and schedule limited repair crews to restore failed com-
ponents so as to mitigate the system resilience loss. The system is
able to recover to at most the same state as prior to the disruption
when all the failed components are repaired.
4) Operational Constraints Under a Normal Operation
Scenario:
(8)–(12) suppressing indices t and s (23)
−f̄l ≤ fl ≤ f̄l ∀l ∈ L. (24)
Additionally, constraints (23) and (24) correspond to the flow
conservation and line capacity constraints under a nominal op-
eration scenario, i.e., the scenario without disruption.
5) Nature of Binary Decision Variables:
vl, wi ∈ {0, 1} ∀l ∈ L′∀i ∈ L0 ∪ V (25)
rits, xits ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ L0 ∪ V ∀t, s. (26)
Finally, (25) and (26) are standard integrality constraints.
The optimal scenario penalty costs C∗s in (7) are calculated
by solving the CIEPP (CIEPPS) below for each of the given
scenario s:
C∗s = min
∑
n∈VD
ce&sn
Ts∑
t=1
Δpnts (27)
subject to
∑
i∈V ∪L0
chari wi +
∑
l∈L′
cinvl vl ≤ B (28)
(8)–(22) for the given scenario s (29)
vl, wi ∈ {0, 1} ∀l ∈ L′∀i ∈ L0 ∪ V (30)
rit, xit ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ L0 ∪ V ∀t = 1 . . . Ts. (31)
The objective function in p-CIEPP states that DMs are more
interested in obtaining a solution that performs well under nom-
inal operation conditions, while the p-robustness constraints (6)
suggest that they are willing to make additional investments in CI
hardening and expansion to protect against potential disruptions
to the CI facilities.
The proposed p-CIEPP framework is applicable to single-
commodity CIs, e.g., power, water, wastewater, and supply chain
systems. However, the current formulation of the p-CIEPP prob-
lem assumes that the link flows can be arbitrarily controlled,
which is not the case for power systems [28]. Therefore, addi-
tional constraints representing the second Kirchhoff’s law must
be embedded into the framework to account for the physics of the
service provided through the power network. The dc power flow
model is a commonly used linear approximation of the power
infrastructure operations. It has been proven to be able to give
good results for active power flows in high-voltage transmission
systems [47] and is widely used in system expansion and pro-
tection planning [18], [41], [48]. Therefore, in our case study
for power infrastructures, we incorporate a set of dc power flow
constraints into the p-CIEPP problem in the same way as in [7],
[28], and [49].
C. Problem Complexity
The proposed p-CIEPP model is a two-stage mixed-integer
linear program (MILP) problem, which is NP-hard [50], as stated
in Proposition 1. Actually, multilevel models are generally very
difficult to solve [51]. Hansen et al. [52] proved that even the
simplest bilevel models, the ones with continuous variables on
every level, are strongly NP-hard. The p-CIEPP has a block di-
agonal structure that includes coupling variables between the
blocks. The first-stage (coupling) variables are the system plan-
ning variables v and w, and the second-stage variables include
postdisruption system restoration scheduling and dispatching
variables r,x,f , g,Δp.
Proposition 1: The p-CIEPP model is NP-hard.
This should not be surprising since NP-hardness is a typical
feature of two-stage programming problems, where different
uncertainty scenarios are considered in the second stage [53].
However, what makes the problem even more challenging to
solve is that the feasibility problem, i.e., determining whether a
given instance of the p-CIEPP is feasible, is itself NP-complete.
Proposition 2: For |S| ≥ 1 and p ≥ 0, the feasibility prob-
lem for the p-CIEPP is NP-complete.
Proof: First, the feasibility problem is in NP since the feasi-
bility of a given solution can be checked in polynomial time. To
prove NP-completeness, we reduce the p-CIEPP to the p-robust
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Fig. 2. Example of an auxiliary graph.
logistics network design problem (p-LNDP) proposed by Peng
et al. [45], whose feasibility problem is NP-complete. Note that
COPC can be rewritten as
COPC =
∑
n∈VG
(
co&mn + c
emi
n
)
⎛
⎝
∑
l∈L|o(l)=n
fl −
∑
l∈L|d(l)=n
fl
⎞
⎠+
∑
l∈L
co&ml fl
+
∑
n∈VD
ce&sn
⎛
⎝p̄n −
∑
l∈L|d(l)=n
fl+
∑
l∈L|o(l)=n
fl
⎞
⎠.
(32)
Then, we construct an auxiliary graph as follows. For any one
of the transmission lines, we replace it with a dummy node and
two new transmission lines. The dummy node has exactly the
same characteristics as the original transmission line. The two
new lines have infinite capacity, zero investment cost (economic
and societal cost of investment in hardening or expansion is
denoted here as cINV and called investment cost for simplicity),
and zero unit flow cost. However, if the new line is connected to
a supply node, its unit flow cost is set as that of the supply node
(the unit flow cost of a supply node n ∈ VG is defined as the sum
of its O&M cost and emission cost, i.e., cOMEn = c
o&m
n + c
emi
n );
if the new line is connected with a demand node n ∈ VD, its
unit flow cost is set as ce&sn of the demand node. Fig. 2 gives an
example consisting of the original graph and its auxiliary graph;
the symbols in the parentheses are capacity (expected demand
for demand nodes), investment cost, unit flow cost, and actual
flow, respectively.
Then, the original problem is equivalent to minimizing the
sum of investment and network flow costs, and if Ts = 1 (i.e.,
there is no restoration process), the p-CIEPP reduces to the p-
LNDP proposed by Peng et al. [45], whose feasibility problem
is proven to be NP-complete. Since Ts = 1 is a special case
of the p-CIEPP, the feasibility problem of the general case of
the p-CIEPP is at least NP-complete. We have already shown
that the feasibility problem of the p-CIEPP is in NP; therefore,
Proposition 2 holds. 
Consequently, unlike most other two-stage robust or stochas-
tic optimization problems, it can be challenging just to find a
feasible solution for the proposed p-CIEPP.
D. Defining Scenario Set of SLDs
Natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes, and other ex-
treme weather) and malicious attacks are generally highly un-
certain events that are difficult to estimate, model, and predict.
In this paper, we consider potential disaster events represented
by SLDs [17], [54], i.e., disruptions that cause direct damage or
interruption of system components, which exist within some lo-
calized area, while those outside this area remain operating. For
example, on August 12, 2015, the Tianjin chemical explosion
event in China caused the damage or interruption of some main
road segments, a subway station, and many other infrastruc-
ture components located within 1 km from the explosion cen-
ter. On January 3, 2018, the strong winds generated by Eleanor
storm caused all the train services to be interrupted through-
out Normandy (the affected area can be seen as a concentric
zone centered on Lisieux and with a radius of around 100 km),
but the railway interruption was still localized from the whole
country view. The 9/11 New York terrorist attacks caused the
full collapse of the WTC1 and the WTC2, and massive debris
caused the damage and interruption of many infrastructure com-
ponents within 0.4 km from the attack center, including power
substations, water pipes, telecommunication centers, and sub-
way tunnels. It can be understood from the above examples that
the SLDs can be triggered by different origins, e.g., natural haz-
ards, human accidents, or intentional attacks. It should be noted
that other types of disruption scenarios could also be considered
in the proposed p-CIEPP model, depending on the particular CI
systems of interest.
The uncertainty of SLDs is modeled through a set of scenario
S, where each scenario represents an attack plan from natural
disaster occurrences or terrorist attacks. The scenario set S is
made up of vectors as of 0s and 1s as follows:
as =
{
a1s, . . . , aM1s, a(M1+1)s, . . . , a(M1+M2)s
}
(33)
where M1 = |V |, M2 = |L0|, and ais is a constant equal to 0 if
facility i is attacked in scenario s, being 1 otherwise. The geo-
graphical vicinity of the disruption is characterized by assuming
that all facilities being attacked are within a distance Rh from a
random location in the system [55]
Dist (i, centr (s)) ≤ Rh ∀ais = 0∀s ∈ S (34)
where centr(s) represents the epicenter location of the disruption
s and Dist(i, j) is the geographical distance between i and j.
Fig. 1(b) presents an illustrative SLD scenario, whose epicenter
is located at D5 and with an influence radius of Rh. An un-
protected line will be considered as failed even if only partially
within the disruption area, e.g., the line G2-D6 in Fig. 1(b).
The scenario set S can be generated in various ways for differ-
ent systems. For simplicity, this paper considers the case withM
scenarios, and in each scenario, one node i ∈ V in the system
is randomly chosen as the epicenter of disruption, and all the
facilities within the circle with center at i and radius equal to Rh
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are regarded as damaged. Since every CI system is unique, every
utility will have a specific set of “what-if” contingencies that it
is interested in considering. DMs can decide which scenarios
are most likely to occur or are of importance to plan against,
in practice. For example, models for specific natural disasters,
such as earthquakes [56] and storms [57], can be used to identify
the disruption scenarios by examining what the potential threats
to the CIs are and how the system components are affected; this
includes the so-called game-theoretical interdiction models for
intentional attacks [12], [58]. These models are outside the scope
of this paper and will be considered in our future research.
III. ALGORITHM DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we first develop an exact algorithm frame-
work based on scenario decomposition for the solution of the
p-CIEPP. Then, a metaheuristic search algorithm is proposed
for efficiently solving the proposed p-CIEPP model by combin-
ing the exact SBD with the heuristics of VNS.
A. Scenario-Based Decomposition
Decomposition is usually used for solving complex MILP
problems with a block diagonal structure that includes coupling
variables between the blocks. Algorithms based on Lagrangian
relaxation and Benders decomposition have been proposed to
solve p-robust network design problems [44], [46]. However,
these approaches can be computationally expensive, especially
when the number of scenarios is large [45]. Here, an SBD method
can be applied to the proposed p-CIEPP model (5)–(26) due to
the following important observation.
Remark 1: All the scenario-dependent decision variables do
not appear in the objective function of the proposed p-CIEPP
model; therefore, any optimal planning solution v and w based
on a subset of disruption scenarios S ′ ⊂ S and feasible for all
considered scenarios S is an optimal solution of the p-CIEPP
model.
Based on this observation, we can develop an SBD scheme
to solve the p-CIEPP model. The basic idea of this algorithm is
to solve problems with iteratively larger sets of scenarios until a
solution is obtained that is feasible for all remaining scenarios. A
similar idea can be found in [59]. The detailed steps are described
as follows.
Algorithm SBD.
Step 0 Set m, S ′ ← S0
Step 1 Solve P (S ′) and obtain the optimal planning
solution ω∗
Step 2 If S\S ′ = ∅, I ← {s1, s2, . . . , s|S\S′ | s ∈ S\S ′ :
F(P̄ (si, ω∗)) ≥ F(P̄ (si+1, ω∗))}; else go to Step 4
Step 3 If F(P̄ (s, ω∗)) ≤ 0 ∀s ∈ I , return ω∗ and terminate;
else, S ′ ← S ′ ∪ {I(1), I(2), . . . , I(m)} and go to
Step 1
Step 4 return ω∗ and terminate
The algorithm initially sets parameter m and takes as input
the set of disruption scenarios and an initial subset of scenarios
to consider, S ′. Step 1 solves p-CIEPP on S ′, where P (S ′) and
ω∗ are used to denote the p-CIEPP problem based on S ′ and the
optimal planning solution, respectively. Step 2 then evaluates
ω∗ on the remaining scenarios in S\S′ if it is not empty. Set I
contains all the remaining scenarios and is descending sorted by
the function value F(P̄ (s, ω∗)) of each scenario s. The func-
tion F : P̄ (s, ω∗)→ R+ measures the degree of infeasibility
of the problem P̄ (s, ω∗) that is 0 if the problem P̄ (s, ω∗) is
feasible, i.e., ω∗ is feasible in terms of constraints (6)–(26), pos-
itive otherwise. Particularly, this is implemented by minimizing
the system resilience loss, i.e., the total cumulative unsatisfied
demand across, for each of the given disruption scenario s. A
positive function value F(P̄ (s, ω∗)) is determined by the mini-
mum system resilience loss when the planning decision ω∗ and
the disruption scenario s are given. This function prices the cur-
rent solution over all remaining scenarios s ∈ S\S′. If all prices
are 0, then the algorithm terminates with solutionω∗. Otherwise,
the algorithm adds the first m scenarios in set I with the top m
worst infeasibility measures to S ′ (Step 3).
B. Variable Neighborhood Search
The most computationally demanding step in the SBD algo-
rithm is to solve the problem P (S ′) in Step 1. It can also be
time-consuming when the number of considered scenarios be-
comes larger. To overcome this limitation, we develop a search
heuristic method based on VNS [36], [60]–[62]. VNS is a pow-
erful metaheuristic, which is based on the systematic change
of neighborhoods toward the local optima and out of the re-
gions that contain them. The algorithm first fixes a subset of
first-stage decision variables v and w to their current values and
then searches the residual variables in order to obtain a better
solution. In fact, if all the decision variables in the first stage
are fixed, the problem is simply decomposed into |S| separate
subproblems that can be solved with much less computational
efforts. More formally, we letP (ω,Z) denotes the problem with
a subset of first-stage variables, let Z ⊂ {v,w} fixed to ω, i.e.,
zi = ω(zi), and PLP represents the LP relaxation of problem
P . Then, the detailed procedure of VNS is given as follows.
Algorithm VNS.
Step 0 Set cpuTime← 0, ω∗ ← ω0, i← 0, flag← false
Step 1 Solve PLP to obtain its optimal planning solution
ωLP
Step 2 Set j ← 0, n← |z ∈ Z : |ω∗(z)− ωLP (z)| = 0|,
Z ← {z1, z2, . . . , z|Z|, z ∈ {v,w} : |ω∗(zi)− ωLP ,
(zi)| ≤ |ω∗(zi+1)− ωLP (zi+1)|}
Step 3 If flag, then i← i+ 1, step← 4n/d,
k ← |{v,w}| − step, and shuffle the set of Z; else,
step← n/d, k ← |{v,w}| − step
Step 4 Solve the problem P (ω∗,Z(1, . . . , k)) to obtain the
solution ω′
Step 5 If f(ω′) < f(ω∗), i.e., ω′ obtains a smaller objective
value than ω∗, then ω∗ ← ω′, i← 0, flag← false,
j ← maxIter; else, j ← j + 1, k ← k − step/2,
and if j > maxIter, then flag ← true.
Step 6 If cpuTime < maxTime, k ≥ 0 and j < maxIter,
go to Step 4; else, go to Step 7
Step 7 If cpuTime < maxTime and i < maxStart, go
to Step 2; else, terminate the algorithm and return ω∗
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The algorithm starts with a feasible solution ω0 and Step 1
solves the LP relaxation of the p-CIEPP to obtain ωLP. Then,
in Step 2, the number of variables assignments that are vari-
ant between the solution ωLP and the best-known solution ω∗
is counted, and the elements in set Z are ordered by the dif-
ference between their assignments in ω∗ and ωLP, where ω(z)
denotes the variable assignment of z in solution ω. Based on
whether the algorithm is in a restart mode indicated by the
variable flag in Step 3, the algorithm will update the rate at
which the size of the neighborhood is increased. If the algo-
rithm is in a restart, the order of the variables in Z is shuf-
fled. Step 4 computes the best solution in the neighborhood
of ω∗, where the first k elements of Z are fixed. If the re-
sulting solution from Step 4 is better, i.e., the objective value
from ω′ is smaller than that from ω∗ (f(ω′) < f(ω∗)), the al-
gorithm updates the currently best-known solution ω∗ ← ω′
and proceeds. Otherwise, the neighborhood size of ω∗ is in-
creased by k ← k − step/2. This neighborhood search iterates
until the predefined maximum number of neighborhood resiz-
ing, maxIter, is reached, or a CPU time limit, maxTime, is
reached (Step 6). The algorithm terminates when a predefined
maximum number of restart times, maxStarts, is reached, or a
CPU time limit, maxTime, is reached (Step 7). This paper sets
maxStart = 5, maxTime = 10 CPU hours, maxIter = 4, and
d = 2.
C. Hybrid SBD and VNS Algorithm
Given that the problem P (S ′) in the SBD algorithm Step 1
can be solved by the VNS heuristics, the two methods can be
hybridized to solve the p-CIEPP model. The hybrid algorithm
proceeds the same as the SBD framework, except that the VNS
algorithm is applied in Step 1 of the SBD algorithm for the
solution of P (S ′).
IV. APPLICATION TO A POWER TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
A. Dataset
A test network model based on the British high-voltage power
transmission system is considered to study the proposed p-
CIEPP model. The original power system includes the 400- and
275-kV transmission levels, and the reduced representative net-
work comprises 29 nodes and 50 lines, as shown in Fig. 3. Tech-
nical data for this system can be found in [63]. Table I provides
data for the productions and demands. Each production unit is
characterized by its maximum generation capacity ḡn (Column
2), the O&M cost for unit power generation co&mn (Column 3),
and unit emission cost cemin (Column 4). Similarly, each demand
node is characterized by its expected value p̄n (Column 6) and
its economic and societal cost of unit load shedding ce&sn (Col-
umn 7). Note that the case study assumes that the O&M cost
associated with a unit of power flow through transmission line
l ∈ L is 0.
Data regarding candidate lines to be potentially built are pro-
vided in Table II, where the last column gives the annualized
investment costs for each of these lines. The annualized invest-
ment costs are assumed with reference to preevious studies [49],
Fig. 3. Test network model of the British electric power transmission system
[66].
[64], which generally scale linearly with physical line length.
Besides, we fix parameter σ in (5) to σ = 8760, which is the
total number of hours in one year. This allows considering the
same scale for both operation costs (hourly basis) and annual-
ized investment costs. The hardening/defense cost for a power
transmission line depends on the types of defense measures (e.g.,
using underground cables instead of overhead lines, upgrading
poles and structures with stronger materials, tree trimming and
vegetation management, building the substation sites with new
structures like walls and floodgates, etc.) and can vary from sys-
tem to system. In this paper, it is assumed to be a constant value
for each existing transmission line, charl = $0.5million, for sim-
plicity, while considering the order of magnitude of the structural
hardening cost in practice [65]. Nevertheless, the defense cost
functions will have to be validated and calibrated when applying
the proposed model to specific systems. This is possible as it is
the system operator that makes the decisions about the allocation
of the defense resources.
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TABLE I
DATA FOR GENERATION AND DEMAND NODES
TABLE II
DATA FOR CANDIDATE LINES
This paper considers different numbers, M , of SLD scenar-
ios with an influencing radius Rh = 100 km to represent poten-
tial natural hazards in the studied areas (e.g., storms in Great
Britain). The different sets of disruption scenarios are generated
randomly and in an incremental way, i.e., scenarios in small sets
(e.g., M = 5) are also included in large sets (e.g., M = 10). Only
transmission lines are failed during disruptions. The repair crew
is the limited resource that is allocated to repair damaged lines.
The expected repair time is based on historical data of power
system restoration [67], [68].
The algorithms are implemented using the CPLEX MATLAB
API and executed on a computer equipped with 16-GB RAM,
500-GB memory, and a quad-core 3.6-GHz Intel I7-4790 pro-
cessor. The MIP solver used is CPLEX 12.6.1 with default pa-
rameter settings.
B. Computational Results and Analysis
First, we investigate the “price of resilience,” in other words,
how much it costs to design a more resilient system that has much
lower resilience loss when disruptive events occur. Fig. 4 shows
the tradeoff curves between the nominal cost (the objective value
(3) that includes the annualized investment cost and total system
Fig. 4. Tradeoff between the robustness measure p and the nominal cost. The
parameter M indicates the number of disruption scenarios. A higher value of p
along the vertical axis means a larger regret in system resilience loss, thus a less
resilient system.
operating costs under nominal condition) and the value of p for
different numbers of disruption scenarios, M=5, 10, and 15. The
influencing radiusRh = 100 km, and the number of repair crew
is one K = 1 for all the three cases. Note that p measures the
maximal relative regret about system resilience loss, and higher
value of p means larger regret in system resilience loss, thus a
less resilient system. It can be found that the left-most portions
of the curves are rather steep, which means that the maximal
relative regret can be largely reduced with only a small increase
in the nominal cost. For instance, in M = 15, we are able to
reduce the maximum relative regret from 3 by 63.3% to 1.1,
with a slight increase in cost from $34.4734 to $35.4734 million,
or 2.9%. In other words, with little additional investment, one
can obtain CI systems that are more resilient to SLDs. Besides,
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TABLE III
INVESTMENT RESULTS FOR M = 5 AND DIFFERENT p
one can find from Fig. 4 that for each fixed p, considering a
larger number of disruption scenarios results in an increased
nominal cost, which is due to the fact that more investments
in system hardening and expansion have to be carried out in
order to protect the system from additional disruptions. That
is, investment decisions are fairly sensitive to the considered
scenario set of SLDs. This suggests that DMs should decide
carefully which disruption scenarios are most likely to occur in
a specific system.
Table III reports the investment results obtained for the sce-
nario set M= 5 under different values of p. Row 3 gives the nom-
inal costs, i.e., the objective values, of the obtained systems, and
Row 4 provides the investment costs. Row 5 represents the costs
of system unmet demand under the worst disruption scenario
(argmaxs
∑
n∈VD c
e&s
n
∑Ts
t=1 Δpnts), and the last row identi-
fies the lines to be protected for each of the cases analyzed. The
investment costs increase with the decreasing p as additional
lines are chosen to be hardened, resulting in increased nominal
costs. However, this relative little additional investment gains a
large reduction in the maximal scenario cost, i.e., the penalty cost
for unmet system demand under the worst disruption scenario,
which represents the maximal system resilience loss under all the
scenarios. In other words, with little additional investment, one
can obtain a large improvement in the system resilience against
the worst disruption scenario. Furthermore, the nonincremental
nature of the investment plan can be observed by increasing the
robustness level (decrease of p). That is to say, the optimum
set of lines to be protected in the small investment case is not
necessarily a subset of the lines to be protected in the large in-
vestment cases. For example, the lines 11-15, 14-15, and 23-24
are protected for the optimum planning if p = 2.5, but they are
replaced by lines 9-11, 14-16, 21-25, and 16-22 if p = 1.5.
The above results are all obtained for only one repair crew K
= 1; we then analyze the impact of different numbers of repair
crews on the optimization results. Fig. 5 shows how the nominal
costs and maximal scenario costs change under different number
of repair crews K for M = 5 and p = 0.5. From this figure, it can
be found that increasing the number of repair crews can lead to
a reduction in the maximal scenario costs, i.e., the penalty cost
Fig. 5. Nominal costs and maximal scenario costs evolve along with different
repair crews K for M = 5 and p = 0.5.
for unmet system demand under the worst disruption scenario,
while the nominal cost keeps unchanged. For example, the max-
imal scenario cost is reduced from $3.01 to $1.66 million when
K increases from 1 to 2, and it is reduced to $1.36 million when
K = 3. However, the mitigation effectiveness of maximal sce-
nario cost becomes less significant when K becomes larger, and
the maximal scenario cost keeps unchanged when K> 6. The re-
sults show that increasing the number of repair crews K, within
a certain region, is also an effective defense strategy to enhance
system resilience against disruptions. As long as the DMs are
aware of the (marginal) cost of deploying one unit of repair crew,
they can decide the optimum number of repair crews, e.g., by
comparing the deployment cost and the reduction of the maxi-
mal scenario cost. The nominal cost (objective value) remains
constant, and the optimization obtains the same investment de-
cision under different K. This is probably because increasing K
may mitigate the penalty cost for each scenario, i.e., the left-
hand side of constraints (6), but it also leads to a reduction of
the optimal penalty costsC∗s in the right-hand side of constraints
(6). Therefore, the relative regret under each scenario may keep
unchanged. This result shows that the investment decisions of
the p-CIEPP model are not sensitive to the number of repair
crews, given that it is determined before the planning.
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TABLE IV
COMPUTATIONAL PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM
Fig. 6. Algorithm performance with different values of p.
Finally, we compare the computational performance of our
algorithm with that of CPLEX in Table IV. Each row with a
different combination of M and p gives an experiment instance.
For each algorithm, two columns report the runtime (“Time”)
and objective value (“Obj.”). The optimality gap with against
the CPLEX lower bound (“Gap”) is also reported when CPLEX
does not converge after 1 h running. The proposed SBD-VNS
algorithm is compared with CPLEX, and the last “Time” column
gives the percentages of CPLEX’s CPU time required by our
algorithm. From the table, one can find that our algorithm takes
only a small fraction of CPLEX’s time (20% on average) to find
the same solution. All the instances of M=15 could not converge
in 3600 s for CPLEX. Furthermore, Fig. 6 visualizes how the
algorithm performance evolves with different p for the dataset
M = 5 and M = 10, for which CPLEX solves to convergence.
It shows that the proposed SBD-VNS algorithm is not affected
much by the value of p, while CPLEX’s solution times are much
affected by different p.
To complement this paper and investigate the applicability
of the proposed method, a large system (the Swiss 380/220-kV
high-voltage power transmission system) comprising 161 nodes
and 210 lines [10], [69] has been considered, and more disruptive
scenarios on it have been analyzed.
Table V provides the results obtained on this additional net-
work. Different numbers of disruption scenarios, M =5, 10,
15, 20, 25, and 30 with an influencing radius Rh = 20 km are
considered. The number of repair crews is set as K = 4. Param-
eter p is set as 3.0, rendering all the considered instances feasi-
ble. In Table V, columns 2–4 report the size of the formulated
problem represented by the number of variables, the number of
binary variables, and the number of constraints. It shows that
the problem size generally increases linearly with the number
of the scenarios considered. For all scenarios, solving the MIP
problem directly by CPLEX could not converge in 3600 s and
with gaps larger than 10% due to the very large problem size.
Columns 5 and 6 report the objective values obtained and com-
putational times needed by the proposed SBD-VNS algorithm.
It can be seen that the computational time increases largely com-
pared with the corresponding cases in the previous test network
in Table IV. Actually, it is a common feature of branch-and-cut-
based algorithms when addressing MIP problems. Nonetheless,
for large-scale networks, the proposed planning problem can be
solved offline, and the issue of CPU time can be tackled by al-
lowing adequate computational time. Also, the computational
complexity can be possibly decreased through approaches like
the distributed computing technique, which could be interesting
future research.
C. Managerial Insights and Discussions
The proposed p-robust optimization model serves as a sup-
porting tool for making decisions on CI system planning, and
both resilience and nominal cost are considered to measure the
consequences of the decisions. The nominal cost focuses on rel-
atively certain consequences that are distributed over the life
cycle and can be predicted with good approximation. Resilience
considers large consequences associated with disruptive events
with small probabilities of occurrence, which are typically dif-
ficult to estimate. In practice, DMs are usually more concerned
with minimizing the nominal operation cost and wish to limit
the regret in each possible contingency scenario so as to bound
system exposure to risk. In this light, the framework of the pro-
posed p-robust optimization appears appropriate to model the
decision problems for CI systems and can lead to a solid and
systematic integration of resilience into system planning.
The previous section shows that, for the tested system, a large
improvement in resilience against SLDs can be achieved with
very little additional monetary investment in transmission line
hardening. Although this result is not necessarily true for other
CI systems, a tradeoff between nominal cost and resilience does
exist. In such scenarios, a comprehensive analysis of all the pos-
sible outcomes of each decision is of utmost importance for
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TABLE V
COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS ON THE SWISS HIGH-VOLTAGE 380/220-KV POWER TRANSMISSION NETWORK FOR DIFFERENT SCENARIOS FOR p = 3.0
DMs. If one solution must be identified to be implemented in
practice, the DMs’ subjective preferences should be taken into
account. For example, Table III shows that the major contributor
to the increase of the nominal cost is the investment cost CINV,
and therefore, a DM may choose an optimal solution from the
Pareto curve (see Fig. 4) that is on his/her real investment bud-
get. More generally, along with the tradeoff curve in Fig. 4, there
are some solution points for which a small cost investment gives
a large gain of system resilience. Therefore, by taking a solution
and its neighbor on the tradeoff curve (the less costly one), one
can define a rate of change of resilience with respect to cost,
|Δp/Δcost|. This rate can be utilized as a reference to make
decisions: the larger the ratio, the more preferred the solution
is. In addition, the results show that increasing the number of
repair crews is also able to enhance system resilience against
disruptions, which is expected. However, the marginal gain in
resilience generally decreases as the number of repair crews
increases. Therefore, a tradeoff between the marginal cost of
deploying repair crews and the marginal gain in resilience is
necessary and should be carefully analyzed for rational decision
making.
Additionally, this paper focuses mainly on proposing a novel
quantitative decision-supporting framework that incorporates
resilience requirements into the system planning/design process.
The scenarios of SLD events are generated by a random mecha-
nism, for the purpose of simplicity. The application of the frame-
work in the real-world setting requires an attentive definition of
the disruption scenarios. In fact, generating a set of relevant dis-
ruption scenarios is a part of the CI identification process (e.g.,
the EC Directive 2008/114/EC requires to develop relevant fail-
ure scenarios of a CI in order to assess the transboundary impacts
on other Member States), which has attracted much attention
[70]–[72]. In practice, methods like the hierarchical ontology
[71] could be used to identify different types of SLD events
faced by a CI system. For each SLD type, sophisticated models
(e.g., for earthquakes [56] and storms [57]) can be used to gener-
ate a subset of relevant disruption scenarios, e.g., the most likely
and the worst-case scenarios, by examining what the potential
threats to the CI systems are and how the system components
are affected. If the number of disruption scenarios is too large,
a subset of the scenarios can be considered using methods like
the sample average approximation [73].
Finally, the proposed system operation model does not con-
sider detailed short-term technical constraints, like unit com-
mitment particularly for power systems, but rather relies on an
average system representation and a generic network flow
model. This is because we aim to propose a scalable mod-
eling framework that can be used for different types of CIs.
Thus, the generic network flow model [3], [4], [28] is used.
For its application to specific CI systems, additional phys-
ical/regulatory constraints can be carefully integrated into
the operational constraints (8)–(15) and (23), (24) if neces-
sary. Also, it would be interesting to relax other model as-
sumptions in our future works. For instance, instead of as-
suming that protected facilities are invulnerable, a stochas-
tic model may be developed to describe the impact of pro-
tection measures, e.g., describing how the failure probability
of a component is reduced under different protection mea-
sures and their strengths. This requires more detailed models of
specific protection measures and of the disruption events, and
the development of the stochastic impact model itself.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a p-robust optimization model for
CI network planning against SLDs. The objective of the model
was to minimize the investment costs and total system costs un-
der nominal operation conditions, which embrace economic, en-
vironmental, and societal dimensions of system operations. The
resilience of the system was integrated into the planning process
by forcing the p-robust constraints, i.e., the solution must have
a relative regret of no more than p in each disruption scenario
considered. Importantly, the postdisruption restoration process
was optimized and taken into account for the quantification of
system resilience loss, different from previous perspectives that
only consider the mitigation of system vulnerability, i.e., protect
the system from immediate performance drop after a disruptive
event. We adopted a hybrid SBD and VNS approach to solve the
model, and computational experiments show that we can obtain
optimal or suboptimal solutions in a fraction of the time required
by CPLEX.
From a managerial point of view, we showed that system re-
silience can be improved greatly without substantial increases
in investment, i.e., creating financial constraints to utilities with
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careful up-front planning for CIP and expansion. A tradeoff
curve generated by choosing different values of parameter p can
help DMs choose the desired resilience level based on budget
constraints. Furthermore, the results also showed that increasing
the number of repair crews, within a certain region, is also an ef-
fective defense strategy to mitigate system resilience loss under
SLDs. A cost-benefit analysis of increasing repair crew could
be carried out to help manager choose the optimum number of
repair crews.
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